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We develop a model of costly technology adoption where the cost is irrecoverable
and ﬁxed. Households must decide when to switch from an existing technology to a
new, more productive technology. Using a recursive approach, we show that there is a
unique threshold level of wealth above which households will adopt the new technology
and below which they will not. This threshold is independent of preference parameters
and depends only on technology parameters. Prior to adoption, households invest at
increasing rates, but consumption growth is constant. We also show that richer
households adopt sooner and that income inequality increases over time. Both these
results are consistent with the evidence from the Green Revolution.
i1I n t r o d u c t i o n
We study capital accumulation in an environment where technology adoption is costly.
We develop a simple model in which a household faces a ﬁx e dc o s tt os w i t c hf r o mal e s s
productive technology to a more productive technology. Given the household’s initial
level of wealth, we examine how the presence of the ﬁxed adoption cost inﬂuences
the evolution of the household’s wealth and the length of time before the household
adopts the higher productivity technology.
Several authors have recognized the important role of technology adoption in
the process of economic development. Prominent examples of technology adoption
and productivity growth episodes include the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 1993),
the Green Revolution (van Zanden, 1991 and Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991) and the
Information Revolution (David, 1990, and Greenwood, 1996). In studying the role
of technology adoption, the literature has followed, essentially, two themes: (i) costs
and beneﬁts of adoption in a variety of environments and (ii) impact of adoption on
macroeconomic variables such as growth, relative wages etc. In the former theme, the
decision to adopt a new technology is cast in an environment with rich details on costs
and beneﬁts. For instance, Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) and Pérez-Sebastián (1996)
posit a trade-oﬀ between the accumulated knowledge in the old technology through
learning-by-doing and the risky, unknown, but higher average productivity of the new
technology. In the latter theme, the focus is on the behavior of related variables in
the economy using relatively simple trade-oﬀs in the technology adoption decision.
1For instance, Parente and Prescott (1994), Parente (1994, 1995) and Easterly, King,
Levine, and Rebelo (1994) try to explain persistent diﬀerences in incomes across
countries.
Our model belongs to the latter theme. We subsume the cost of adopting a new
technology entirely into an exogenous ﬁxed cost. The beneﬁt of adoption is higher
productivity. The ﬁxed cost in our model is the cost of learning the new method
of production. For instance, in the context of the Green Revolution, farmers had to
learn how to use the new variety seeds with other inputs. Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995) document that the learning cost was non-trivial: knowledge about the new
seeds was a signiﬁcant barrier to adopting the high-yield technology during the Green
Revolution. Furthermore, Wozniak (1987) ﬁnds that the decision to adopt is a human
capital intensive activity.
Capital, interpreted broadly to include both physical and human, is the sole factor
of production in our model. Both the old and the new technologies are linear.1 Our
aim is to characterize the path of capital accumulation. For inﬁnitely lived house-
holds with time separable homothetic preferences, we show that prior to adopting
the high productivity technology, capital is accumulated at increasing rates, i.e., the
growth rate of capital is monotonically increasing in the level of capital. Once a
household reaches a threshold level of wealth, it pays the ﬁxed cost and adopts the
new technology. Consumption growth is constant during this period of increasing
1In our model, each household’s wealth is its composite physical and human capital stock,
so we will treat the terms ‘capital’ and ‘wealth’ as synonymous throughout the paper.
2investment.
The threshold level of capital at which a household switches to the new technology
is independent of the initial level of wealth. Consequently, the duration with the low
productivity technology is decreasing in the initial level of wealth. (This is consistent
with the ﬁndings in Wozniak, 1987, and Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991.) Furthermore,
the threshold is independent of preference parameters and depends only on the pro-
ductivity of the two technologies and the ﬁxed cost of adoption. These technology
parameters inﬂuence the date of adoption in our model directly through their eﬀect
on the threshold level of wealth and indirectly through their eﬀect on the evolution
of wealth. Higher productivity of the old technology tends to postpone the adoption
date; higher productivity of the new technology induces households to adopt the new
technology sooner; and a higher ﬁxed cost postpones the adoption date.
We show numerically that income inequality increases over time along with aver-
age capital across households. In our model, the wealthier households take advantage
of the more productive technology by adopting it sooner and, hence, beneﬁtp r o p o r -
tionately more than the poorer households. Income of all households eventually grows
at the same rate, but the levels remain distinct. Our result on increasing inequality
while households are engaged in technology adoption is consistent with evidence from
rural India (Gaiha, 1987) and the Philippines (Bautista, 1997).
While we derive these results under the assumption that households may neither
borrow nor lend amongst themselves, our results are robust to the introduction of
3consumption loans that may be used by low productivity households to indirectly ﬁ-
nance the cost of technology adoption. However, we maintain the assumption that low
productivity households may not circumvent costly technology adoption by investing
with high productivity households.
We also make a methodological contribution in this paper. We set up a sequence
of dynamic programs, one for each possible adoption date. Each dynamic program
yields a value function that helps us evaluate whether the associated adoption date
is optimal. One may use our dynamic programming technique to study a variety of
situations where there is a one-time cost. For instance, consider a household deciding
whether to migrate from a developing country to a developed country. If there is
ao n e - t i m eﬁxed cost at the time of migration, then our technique will be useful
in determining the wealth accumulation prior to migration and the period in which
the household chooses to migrate. Other examples include opening an economy to
international trade or implementing a radical change in policy.
In related work, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) examine a growth model where
agents must pay a one-time start-up cost to avail themselves of the services of ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries who provide information on the proﬁtability of a risky asset
relative to a safe asset. In contrast to their analysis, we derive a unique threshold
level of capital at which households adopt the higher productivity technology and
show that this threshold is independent of preference parameters. We also explicitly
solve for the path of capital accumulation. However, we abstract from issues involv-
4ing uncertainty in the production technologies or intermediation. Bental and Peled
(1996) develop a search-theoretic model where technological progress is endogenous.
Improvements in technology depend on costly search, and the search process is one
of sequential sampling with a ﬁx e dc o s ta s s o c i a t e dw i t he a c hs a m p l e .T h e i rp r o b l e m
is to determine the optimal stopping time, i.e., the number of samples above which
one stops looking for improvements in technology. Our problem is to determine the
optimal starting time, the period when one starts using the better technology. While
growth is endogenous in our framework, technological progress is not.
2T h e M o d e l
Time is discrete and is indexed by t. Households initially produce output, Yt,u s i n g
a technology characterized by a constant marginal product of capital whose value is
A>1, i.e., Yt = AKt,w h e r eKt is the composite physical and human capital stock
(or the sum of physical and human wealth), at the beginning of period t. We will
model the ﬁxed cost of adoption as a reduction in wealth at the time of adoption,
i.e., it costs any household λ > 0 units of capital to adopt a new technology. This
ﬁxed cost λ allows a household permanent access to a more productive technology
characterized by a constant marginal product B>A .
Any household may be in one of three stages at any point in time: it may be
operating the old technology; it might have paid the ﬁxed cost and just adopted the
new technology; or it might be operating the new technology, having adopted it in
5the past. Let S denote the time at which a given household pays the cost of adoption.










The household faces the following resource constraints conditional on S.
Ct + Kt+1 ≤ AKt for t =0 ,1...,S− 1,
CS + KS+1 ≤ B (KS − λ), (1)
Ct + Kt+1 ≤ BKt for t = S +1 ,S+2 ,...
While capital is assumed to fully depreciate each period, this is without loss of gen-
erality, since a depreciation rate may be subsumed into the coeﬃcients A and B.
Households are assumed to discount future utility by the constant β ∈ (0,1),a n d
their preferences are assumed to be time-separable. We assume βA ≥ 1.2 Utility
over consumption in period t, Ct,i sg i v e nb y(1 − β)
C1−σ
t
1−σ ,σ > 0. (We interpret the
σ =1case as logarithmic utility.) The lifetime utility maximization problem for a
household identiﬁed by an initial level of wealth of K0 is presented below.
2If βA<1, then, as we will see, it is possible that an initially poor household may never














Ct ≥ 0, t =0 ,1,...,
K0 given.
Two remarks are in order. First, our formulation allows for immediate adoption;
households may choose to adopt the new technology in period 0. Indeed, we will show
that a household with suﬃciently large initial wealth will follow exactly this strategy.
Second, the ﬁxed cost of technology adoption is closely related to the time interval
between periods in our model. For example, suppose it takes ﬁve years of time and
material expenditures to bring the new technology on line. Then the ﬁxed cost is the
present value of these resources, and the time interval between model-periods is ﬁve
years.
A straightforward but cumbersome two-step approach to solving the above prob-
l e mi sa sf o l l o w s .F i r s t ,f o re a c hS ≥ 0 where adoption is feasible (in the sense that
KS > λ), determine the path of capital accumulation given S, both before and af-
ter technology adoption. Given the path of capital, determine lifetime utility as a
function of S and initial capital. Next, choose the value of S that yields the high-
est level of lifetime utility. While the ﬁrst step is a relatively straightforward utility
maximization problem, the introduction of the second step requires solving the ﬁrst
7problem an inﬁnite number of times, since, in the absence of any characterization of
the properties of the solution, we have to evaluate lifetime utility for each feasible
value of S. We circumvent this problem below by following a recursive approach.
3 Households’ Decision Rules
3.1 Technology adoption: a recursive characterization
We formulate a set of indirect lifetime utility functions deﬁned over capital, each
associated with a particular period for adoption. This allows us to complete the ﬁrst
step of the solution approach described above and determine the path of capital ac-
cumulation given a time for, or more accurately a time until, technology adoption.
Moreover, we are able to essentially replace the second step by mapping the origi-
nal problem of locating the optimal S into an equivalent problem of determining a
threshold level of wealth at which the household will adopt the new technology.3
To characterize the technology adoption problem, it is necessary to know the value
of each household’s wealth in three distinct scenarios: the value after adoption, the
value assuming it never adopts the new technology, and the value given it adopts the
new technology in some arbitrary period T.T h er e s u l t sw ed e r i v eh e r eh o l df o ra l l
σ > 0 (see Appendix 6.2); however, for expositional convenience, we concentrate on
t h ec a s ew h e r eU (Ct)=( 1− β)logCt (i.e., σ =1 ). We assume that households can
3Horowitz (1993), in a ﬁnite horizon model of moving from a traditional sector to a
modern sector, solves for the optimal switching time directly (instead of deriving the critical
level of capital above which it is optimal to switch).
8neither borrow nor lend. This assumption is partially relaxed below.
We start our characterization of the technology adoption decision by characteriz-
ing households that have already adopted the more productive technology. Let H (K)
denote lifetime utility for a household currently using the high productivity technol-
ogy that has K units of capital. For such a household, the constraint correspondence
ΓH (K)={K
0 ∈ R+ | K
0 ≤ BK}
is the set of feasible values for next period’s capital, K0. For households not using
the more productivity technology, let the constraint set for K0 be deﬁned by
ΓL (K)={K
0 ∈ R+ | K
0 ≤ AK}.
As B>A ,i tf o l l o w st h a tf o ra n yK ≥ 0, ΓL (K) ⊆ ΓH (K). Hence, a household
currently using the higher productivity technology will never use the original, less
productive technology in future. Consequently, H will solve the following Bellman
equation:
H (K)= m a x
K0∈ΓH(K)
U (BK − K
0)+βH (K
0). (2)
T h ee x i s t e n c eo fa nu n i q u eH that solves the functional equation (2) follows from
Alvarez and Stokey (1998). We denote the optimal policy for next period’s capital
associated with this dynamic programming problem as K0 = gH (K).
We deﬁne the value of capital for a household under the assumption that it never
adopts the more productive technology as L(K):
9L(K)= m a x
K0∈ΓL(K)
U (AK − K
0)+βL(K
0).( 3 )
The policy function for this benchmark is denoted gL (K). Equations (2) and (3) may
be used to verify that






+l o gK,( 4 )






+l o gK.( 5 )
These solutions yield associated policies: gH (K)=βBK and gL (K)=βAK.
Using our solution for the lifetime utility function post-adoption, H, allows us
to solve for lifetime utility functions pre-adoption, Z,g i v e ns o m en u m b e ro fp e r i o d s
until adoption, T.S p e c i ﬁcally, for T =0 ,1,..., Z (K,T) describes lifetime utility
as a function of capital when technology adoption will occur in T periods; T =0
represents immediate adoption. Since the constraint set during the adoption period
is given by {K0 ∈ R+ | K0 ≤ B (K − λ)} = ΓH (K − λ), Z (K,0) must satisfy (6).
Z (K,0) = max
K0∈ΓH(K−λ)
U (B (K − λ) − K
0)+βH (K
0).( 6 )
An examination of equation (2) reveals Z (K,0) = H(K − λ). Iterating backward,
the period prior to technology adoption we have
Z (K,1) = max
K0∈ΓL(K)
U (AK − K
0)+βZ (K
0,0).( 7 )
10We note that before the adoption period the constraint set is given by ΓL (K).G e n -
erally, Z (K,T +1 )is deﬁned recursively using Z (K,T),
Z (K,T +1 )= m a x
K0∈ΓL(K)
U (AK − K
0)+βZ (K
0,T).( 8 )
We now solve the time-until-adoption value functions Z (K,T). The function
Z (K,0) is easily determined using the solution for H in (4),






+l o g( K − λ),( 9 )
and implies that gZ (K,0) = βB (K − λ). Next, backward induction using (8) for
T =1 ,2,..., yields


















and the associated optimal policies
gZ (K,T +1 )=βAK +
1 − β
AT λ.( 1 1 )
Thus far, we have essentially restated the approach to determining S, described
in the previous section, in terms of an equivalent problem of determining T.O u r
determination of lifetime utility prior to adoption as a function of both K and T,
Z (K,T),h a sc o m p l e t e dt h eﬁrst step of the approach to characterizing the technology
11adoption problem. If we were to now implement the second step and determine the
optimal period of adoption, S∗,w ew o u l dh a v et oﬁnd the optimal number of periods
to wait until technology adoption, T ∗,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes Z (K,T∗) ≥ Z(K,T),f o rT =
0,1,2,...,g i v e nK. As we have already noted, this approach is cumbersome, requiring
an inﬁnite number of function evaluations. Instead, we determine the threshold level
of wealth, K∗, at which each household will adopt the new technology and use the
accumulation behavior implied by (11) to determine T ∗ as the time taken to reach
the threshold level of capital starting from an initial capital stock of K0.
There are obvious bounds on the threshold level of capital. For instance, if a
household’s capital is less than λ, the household cannot adopt the new technology.
This does not imply, however, that the household will switch as soon as it reaches
a level of capital above λ. To see this, consider a household with λ units of capi-
tal. If this household never adopts the new technology, its lifetime utility is L(λ).
If it decides to adopt the new technology, then from (4) and (5) it is clear that
limK→λ Z(K,0) <L (λ). By continuity, the household will not adopt even if it has
capital close to but greater than λ.
An upper bound on the threshold level of wealth may be found as follows. Let
K be such that the output, net of ﬁxed cost, under the new technology is the same
as the output in the old technology, i.e., B(K − λ)=AK or K = Bλ/(B − A).
(See Figure 1.) A household with capital K ≥ K will immediately adopt the new
technology. This follows from a simple observation: any consumption sequence that
12is feasible when the household operates the old technology for T ≥ 1 periods and
then switches to the new technology is also feasible if the household adopts the new
technology immediately. However, the converse is not true. Hence, the household is
better oﬀ switching to the new technology if its capital is K ≥ K.
So far we know that the threshold level of capital lies in [λ,K]. It turns out that
there is a unique threshold level of wealth above which all households will adopt the
higher productivity technology and below which they will not.
Proposition 1 Let K ∗ = B−1
B−Aλ. A household will adopt the new technology if and
only if K ≥ K∗.
The proof is in the Appendix.4 Brieﬂy, our proof has three steps. First, we show
that a household with capital K ∗ or higher will immediately adopt rather than wait
one more period. Second, we prove that at this threshold, the household will adopt
immediately rather than wait any ﬁnite number of periods. Finally, we establish that
the household would rather adopt the new technology than never adopt, when its
wealth exceeds the threshold.
Clearly, K ∗ ∈ (λ,K) since A>1. Furthermore, the threshold level of wealth
is decreasing in B,i n c r e a s i n gi nA, and increasing in λ.N o t e t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t
to Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), the threshold level of capital in our model is
unique. Below, we examine the implication of these properties for the length of time
until adoption and the evolution of each household’s wealth.
4Section 6.2 of the Appendix proves that this threshold level of capital K∗ is independent
of σ.
133.2 Evolution of households’ wealth
The evolution of wealth after adoption is completely described by the policy function
gH (K)=βBK. The path of wealth prior to adoption depends on when the new
technology is adopted (see equation (11)). However, since we know the threshold level
of wealth at which households adopt the new technology, we are able to compute the
time taken to reach K∗, given an initial wealth K0, using (11).
Suppose that a household plans to adopt the new technology in period S and has
K0 units of initial capital. Then, setting T = S − t in (11), we have
Kt =
(1 − β)λ
AS−t + βAKt−1,t =1 ,...,S.( 1 2 )






tK0,t =1 ,...,S.( 1 3 )
Deﬁne this household’s growth rate of wealth pre-adoption to be γt ≡
Kt+1
Kt , t =






It is easy to see that γt is rising over time. First, starting from any K0,t h eh i g h e s t
level of capital that a household can possibly have in period S is ASK0;h e n c e ,
KS ≤ ASK0.F o r S to be the adoption period, KS must be greater than λ;s oi t
14follows that ASK0 − λ > 0 is a necessary condition. Second, since β < 1, β
t is a
decreasing function of t. Hence, γt > γt−1 > γt−2 > ... > γ0.
The increasing growth rate of capital implies that the investment rate,
Kt+1−Kt
AKt ,
is also rising over time. This may be explained as follows. While a household would
like to access the high productivity technology soon, it would also rather have more
current consumption than more future consumption. Consequently, the investment
rate is low in the earlier periods and high in the later periods. A household that begins
with K0 units of capital invests at an increasing rate until it reaches the threshold
K∗,p a y st h eﬁxed cost of λ units of capital and switches to the new technology. We
thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Prior to technology adoption by a household, the growth rate of its
capital and the investment rate are both monotonically increasing over time.
We can use (13) to determine the adoption period. Assuming that the switching
period is S, the wealth at the beginning of period S is given by
KS =( 1− β
S)λ +( βA)
SK0.
For S to be the switching period, we must have KS ≥ K∗.B yr e p l a c i n gKS with K∗
on the left-hand side of the above expression, we may solve for b S and set S as the
next largest integer. Informally, graphing the two sides of
K
∗ =( 1− β
S)λ +( βA)
SK0 (14)
15as functions of S, the intersection point gives us the switching period (subject to
an integer constraint). This is illustrated in Figure 2. While S cannot be solved
analytically, a numerical solution to the nonlinear equation (14) is easy to obtain.
This numerical solution is critical for computing the evolution of capital for each
household. Once we solve for S, the entire path of capital accumulation in the pre-
adoption state can be determined by using (13). Our recursive approach relies on the
result that we have a unique threshold level of capital above which households adopt
the higher productivity technology.
An implication of (14) is that the switching period depends on the initial wealth.
Since the threshold does not depend on the initial level of capital, a lower K0 implies a
higher S for equation (14) to be satisﬁed. The threshold level of capital is determined
by the technology parameters, A, B, and λ. Poorer households, starting with a lower
level of initial capital, will take longer to reach K∗ even if they accumulate capital at
the same rate as wealthier households. In fact, in our setup, poorer households save
a smaller fraction of their income relative to the rich households (see Proposition
2). Hence, the new technology is adopted at a later date by households that are
relatively poor. This is in contrast to the two-period model of Eswaran and Kotwal
(1989) where lack of access to loans is the key reason why poor farmers adopt later.
(For more details on the eﬀect of loans in our model, see section 3.3.)
Proposition 3 The lower is the level of initial household capital, the is later the
adoption date.
16Proposition 3 is consistent with the ﬁndings in Wozniak (1987), given our inter-
pretation of K as a mix of physical and human capital. He ﬁnds that the technology
adoption decision is a human capital intensive activity and that early adopters tend
to be those with high levels of human capital.
Next, we study the eﬀect of changes in the underlying parameters upon the switch-
ing period. Combining equation (14) with Proposition 1, we have
B − 1
B − A
λ =( 1− β
S)λ +( βA)
SK0.( 1 5 )
where the left-hand side is, of course, the threshold level of capital, K∗.Ah i g h e rl e v e l
of post-adoption productivity B0 >Baccelerates the pace of technology adoption.
First, as noted in the previous section, B0 implies a lower threshold than B. Second,
the path of wealth accumulation in the pre-adoption state does not depend on the
productivity of the new technology. That is, the left-hand side of (15) is lower but
the right-hand side remains the same. Hence, the time until adoption is reduced.
Now consider the eﬀect of a higher ﬁxed cost of adoption, λ
0 > λ. For each unit
increase in λ, the left-hand side of (15) increases by B−1
B−A > 1 while the right hand
side increases by 1 − β
S < 1. Thus, the switching period has to increase to satisfy
equation (15). The intuition for this is fairly straightforward. A higher ﬁxed cost
raises the barrier to adoption, so starting from the same initial condition households
adopt later. Clearly, earlier adoption in this case would suggest that households’
behavior was not rational when the ﬁxed cost was lower.
17We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A more productive new technology implies faster technology adoption
while higher adoption costs delay technology adoption.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of higher productivity in the initial technology, i.e.,
B>A 0 >A . The reduced net return to adoption suggests a delay in the time
of adoption. However, the rise in pre-adoption productivity implies that while the
threshold wealth for adoption rises, so does the savings rate prior to technology
adoption. Consequently, the path of wealth accumulation shifts up. Overall, it is
unclear whether the switching period falls or rises. Figure 2 illustrates the switching
time for a household using a simple numerical example. It is clear from the ﬁgure
that households adopt the new technology later under A0 than under A.W e h a v e
found this result to be robust to changes in parameters.
A notable feature of our model is that household consumption and wealth do not
grow at the same rate prior to adoption. To see this, consider a household that plans
to adopt the new technology in period S and has K0 units of initial capital. From the
resource constraint (1) we know that the gain to giving up a unit of consumption in







A, t =0 ,...,S− 2.
18During these periods, consumption growth is constant and equal to βA.P r o p o s i t i o n
2, however, showed that the rate of growth of wealth is increasing over time during
this period.5 The contrast in growth rates is especially stark when one considers the
case βA =1 :t h elevel of consumption stays constant, but wealth exhibits growth.
The reason for saving despite the low rate of return is that even though the ‘current’
return to savings is low, the ‘anticipated rate of return’ to savings is high. Households
take this into account when making their intertemporal decisions.
Post-adoption our model implies that the rates of growth of capital and consump-
tion are equal. When the household reaches period S−1, the gain to giving up a unit







B, t = S − 1,S,....
Once technology adoption is completed, consumption and investment are constant
proportions of the current stock of capital.
5Models with minimum consumption requirements (such as Chatterjee and Ravikumar,
1999) imply an increasing rate of consumption growth and an increasing grwoth rate of
wealth. For instance, suppose that U (Ct)=( 1− β)log(Ct − C), C > 0, and that the rate
of return to saving is constant. Then, as households accumulate capital they move away
from C a n dt h eg r o w t hr a t e so fb o t hc o n s u m p t i o na n dw e a l t hi n c r e a s e .
193.3 Loans
As we have stressed, the form of technology adoption we are examining is a human
capital intensive activity. Hence, access to loans may not directly help a household
adopt the high productivity technology. However, households may be able to adopt
the technology sooner if they have other means of ﬁnancing consumption. Our analysis
above has not allowed for this possibility. We relax this assumption now.
Suppose the households that have not yet adopted the high productivity tech-
nology could obtain consumption loans from the households that have adopted the
high productivity technology. Since the gross rate of return on the new technology
is B, the lowest possible interest rate acceptable to the high productivity households
is r = B − 1.6 I fah o u s e h o l dd e c i d e st ob o r r o w ,t h eo n l yr e a s o nf o rd o i n gs oi st o
switch to the new technology immediately since r>A− 1. Consider a household
with K0 > λ units of capital borrowing Bλ units of goods and repaying the loan in
constant amounts starting next period. At the interest rate r,t h ep e rp e r i o dp a y -
ment must equal rBλ.I n p e r i o d 0, the household uses the borrowed resources Bλ
to ﬁnance consumption. From period 1 on, the household repays the loan by the
constant amount rBλ each period. Thus, the household’s budget constraint is
6The presence of ﬁxed cost prevents us from aggregating heterogenous households into a
representative household. Hence, in contrast to Becker (1981, 1982), we cannot exploit the
equivalence between optimality and competitive equilibrium in order to derive the implica-
tions for equilibrium interest rates.
20C0 + K1 ≤ B (K0 − λ)+Bλ,
Ct + Kt+1 ≤ BKt − rBλ for t =1 ,2,....
Deﬁne y ≡ rBλ
B−1, so at the interest rate B − 1, y = Bλ. We can then modify the
household’s budget constraint as follows:
C0 + K1 − y ≤ B(K0 − λ),
Ct + Kt+1 − y ≤ B(Kt − y) for t =1 ,2,....
Deﬁne e Kt ≡ Kt − y for t =1 ,2,.... The above constraints, restated using e Kt, allow
us to reformulate this household’s problem: it begins with e K0 = K0 − λ units of




. It follows that
the household values this at H( e K0)=H(K0 − λ)=Z(K0,0) using (6). That is, the
access to loans potentially helps the household immediately adopt the new technology
and realize the value Z(K0,0).
The surprising result is that access to such loans does not make the borrowing
household better oﬀ. To see this, suppose that the initial level of capital is less than
the threshold, i.e., K0 <K ∗. In this case, the household would be better oﬀ by
ignoring the loan markets and waiting one or more periods before switching, since
Z(K0,0) <Z (K0,1) for K0 <K ∗ (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix). If K0 ≥ K∗,t h e
household would indeed switch immediately, but it would have done so even without
21access to loans (see Proposition 1). Thus, the path of wealth and the threshold level
of wealth in our model are robust to the introduction of loans to help low productivity
households accelerate their technology adoption. To understand this result, note that
the per period return on investment for a household operating the low productivity
technology exceeds A − 1 b u ti sl e s st h a nB − 1. Clearly, such a household will not
be willing to borrow at the interest rate B − 1.7
While we have shown that allowing for consumption loans by poor households
does not aﬀect their timing of technology adoption or accumulation of capital, we
have not considered the possibility of lending by these households. In the absence of
capital market imperfections, households without direct access to the high produc-
tivity technology would prefer to invest in the production of those already operating
the high productivity technology instead of engaging in costly technology adoption.
This in turn would imply that technology adoption occurs only at the wealthiest
households, and all remaining households abandon production to become outside
lenders. However, such a pattern of adoption would clearly contradict the empiri-
cal evidence that during the Green Revolution, poor households, alongside wealthier
households, engaged in technology adoption, though they adopted later. (See, for
example, Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991). Other evidence includes Jovanovic and Mac-
Donald (1994), who study the diﬀusion of Diesel locomotives and Dekimpe, Parker
7If relatively wealthy households faced any uncertainty regarding loan repayments from
poorer households, the interest rate would rise above B − 1. Wealthier households would
demand a premium to compensate for the default risk. Clearly, the poor households will
not borrow in such circumstances as they chose not to do so at an interest rate of B − 1.
22and Sarvary (1997), who study adoption of cellular phone technology.
Similar to models in the diﬀusion literature, our model implicitly assumes a cap-
ital market imperfection: low income households are unable to invest with high pro-
ductivity households. We suggest the following basis for this assumption. If low
productivity investors have no ability to ensure that their loans to high productiv-
ity households will be repaid, the unenforceability of loan contracts would eliminate
borrowing and lending altogether in our model. There is, in fact, considerable evi-
dence that legal protection of investors’ rights varies across economies. For example,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) examine rules protecting in-
vestment across 49 countries and ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the legal protection
of investors. One interpretation of their work is that, all else being equal, poorer
economies oﬀer weaker investor protection. In fact, the insecurity of economic rights
due to arbitrary decision-making by government and the uncertainty of legal and
contractual rights are believed to be particularly acute, with adverse eﬀects on the
availability of investment, in many developing economies (World Bank, 1987, p.62).
In the context of our model, the interest rate, r, on loans from low productivity to
high productivity households must have the property that r ≥ B −1 to ensure ﬁnite
demand for such loans. However, at these interest rates, high productivity households
are always better oﬀ defaulting on loans if they are able to do so. For such households,
borrowing at interest rates bounded below by B − 1 does not oﬀer any positive net
beneﬁt. Therefore, given any level of investment, a high productivity household
23would retain all output and refuse to repay the investment loan. (This result holds
even if we assume that a borrower who defaults on loans will be credibly excluded
from subsequent borrowing.) Consequently, low productivity households would be
unwilling to lend to high-productivity households in the absence of a commitment
technology that ensured repayment of loans. Such commitment devices are likely to
be absent in less developed economies, and thus our model is most applicable to such
environments.
4 Income Inequality
As discussed in the previous section, a crucial assumption in our model is the lack
of institutions that channel the endowments of those operating the low productivity
technology to those operating the high productivity technology. While this may
be empirically justiﬁable in the context of a developing country during the Green
Revolution, this assumption has implications for the evolution of income inequality
that may provide another test of our model. Suppose that the initial level of wealth
was diﬀerent across households. Then, as noted in propositions 2 and 3, wealthier
households will grow faster in the pre-adoption stage and adopt the high productivity
technology earlier. In the post-adoption stage, all households grow at the same rate.
In ﬁgure 3, we illustrate path of capital for diﬀerent levels of initial capital. The
technology adoption decision is evident in the ridge that is a result of the ﬁxed cost
of technology adoption and the high rates of capital growth displayed by households
24as they approach the adoption decision. Examining the period of adoption as a
function of the initial level of capital, we see that wealthier households will adopt
earlier. After adoption, the rise in the return to savings as a result of the high
productivity technology generates faster increases in wealth. Since the rate of growth
of wealth is initially increasing in the level of wealth and subsequently independent
of the level of wealth, the poor never catch up with the rich in our model. Thus,
while all households eventually achieve the same growth rate of income, their levels
of income remain distinct.
In Figure 4, we illustrate the evolution of income inequality over time. We use
the Lorenz Dominance criterion to rank income distributions in diﬀerent periods.
(See Nygard and Sandstrom, 1981, for a deﬁnition of Lorenz Dominance.) Over
time, the Lorenz curve moves away from the 45-degree line, indicating that income
inequality is increasing over time.8 In Figure 5, we summarize income inequality in
each period with a commonly used index, the Gini coeﬃcient, and plot its evolution
over time. The top panel contains the log of mean income across households, so the
slope at any point in time is the growth rate of average income. The bottom panel
contains the Gini coeﬃcient. Note that income inequality is increasing as the average
capital increases. This is consistent with several studies on income distribution and
agricultural productivity growth. For instance, Gaiha (1987) documents that during
8Since average income (across households) in our economy is changing over time, Gener-
alized Lorenz Dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) may be a more appropriate way to rank income
distributions. However, we focus only on positive growth, so Lorenz Dominance and Gen-
eralized Lorenz Dominance yield the same ranking of distributions.
25the Green Revolution income inequality increased in rural India since large cultivators
beneﬁted disproportionately from the new, more productive technology. Bautista
(1997) ﬁnds that during the period of dramatic growth in rice yield in the Philippines
(1965-80) proportionately larger income beneﬁts accrued to large-farm than small-
farm households, resulting in an increase in income inequality.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a model of costly technology adoption where the cost is irrecov-
erable and ﬁx e d . T h ep a t ho fw e a l t hi nt h i sm o d e lh a sb e e nc h a r a c t e r i z e du s i n ga
recursive approach. Speciﬁcally, we formulated a sequence of value functions, one
for each possible adoption date, and showed that there is a unique threshold level
of wealth at which households adopt the more productive technology. We ﬁnd that
this threshold is independent of initial wealth and depends only on technology para-
meters. Hence, wealthier households undertake earlier technology adoption. Prior to
adoption, households’ savings rates rise until they reach the threshold level of wealth,
but the rate of consumption growth remains constant. Our results on technology
adoption and capital accumulation hold even if the households that have already
adopted the high productivity technology could indirectly ﬁnance the adoption cost
of other households.
A crucial assumption in our model is the lack of institutions that channel the
endowments of those operating the low productivity technology to those operating
26the high productivity technology. Given that some farmers had already adopted the
high productivity technology during the Green Revolution, an interesting question
is why the remaining farmers did not rent out their factors of production. In future
research, we plan to follow the approach in Atkeson (1991) and Phelan (1995) and
examine whether lack of contract enforcement helps explain why the low productivity
households do not lend to the high productivity households.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Our proof of Proposition 1 proceeds along the three steps outlined in the text.
Lemma 5 For a household with K ≥ K∗, it is better to switch immediately rather
than wait one more period. Formally, Z(K,0) ≥ Z(K,1) ⇐⇒ K ≥ K∗.
Proof. The functional equations (9) and (7) imply that
Z (K,0) ≥ Z (K,1) ⇔ logB +l o g( K − λ) ≥ log(AK − λ)
⇔ B(K − λ) ≥ AK − λ.
The last inequality is true for K ≥ K∗.
Lemma 6 If a household has K ≥ K∗, it is better to switch now than wait a ﬁnite
number of periods, i.e., for K ≥ K∗, Z(K,0) ≥ Z(K,T), T =2 ,3,....
27Proof. Suppose that the household prefers to switch T periods hence, instead of
switching immediately. Note from the optimal policy (11) that the growth rate of
wealth exceeds βA.S i n c e βA ≥ 1 by assumption, the wealth T − 1 periods hence
will be greater than K∗. By Lemma 5 it is optimal to switch in period T − 1 rather
than wait until period T. A similar argument applies to T −2 versus T −1.W o r k i n g
backward, it is easy to see that it is optimal to switch immediately.
Lemma 7 If a household has K ≥ K∗, it is better to switch to the new technology
now than never switch, i.e., for K ≥ K∗, Z(K,0) ≥ L(K).
Proof. The functional equation (10) implies that
lim
T→∞






logA +l o gK
since β ∈ (0,1) and A>1. Note that the right-hand side is the same as L(K).T h u s ,
the sequence of functions Z (K,T) converges to the function L(K).N o w , s u p p o s e
for K ≥ K∗, Z(K,0) <L (K). Then, there exists a T suﬃciently large such that
Z(K,0) <Z (K,T). This contradicts Lemma 6.
It is clear from lemmas 5, 6, and 7 that K∗ is the threshold level of wealth, as
stated in Proposition 1.
6.2 Isoelastic Preferences
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with gH (K)=sBBK and gL (K)=sAAK. Thus, we see that sA represents the
savings rate under the plan which permanently uses the low productivity technology
while sB is the rate of savings under the high productivity program. We assume that
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and gZ (K,0) = sBB [K − λ] and gZ (K,1) = sBAK +( 1− sB)λ.
Finally, as in section 3, we now solve for the family of value functions, Z(K,T+1).
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sAXTAK +( 1− sB)λA−T
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.
29Note that limT→∞ Z (K,T +1 )=L(K) and limT→∞g (K,T +1 )=gL (K). We will
show that the threshold value of capital, K∗, is unchanged relative to that which
deﬁned the level of wealth associated with technology adoption for the case of log-
arithmic utility. Before we proceed, it is useful to show that the capital stock is
monotonically rising over time in the pre-adoption state.
Lemma 8 For all σ > 0, given sAA>1, g (K,T +1 )>K , T =0 ,1,.....















A (1 − sA) or
XT+1 <X T. Therefore g (K,T +1 )>s AAK > K.
When σ > 1,t h er a t i o
XT
XT+1 is increasing in T. At its lowest value, when T =0 ,
we have g (K,T +1 )>s A
X0
X1AK = sBAK > K.
Note that our additional assumption sAA>1 is suﬃcient, but not necessary, to
prove that capital rises over time. However, given our result that the stock of capital
is growing over time, independently of T, we are able to apply lemmas 5-7 for the
case of isoelastic utility.
Proposition 9 The high yield technology is adopted if and only if K ≥ K∗.
Proof. Ad i r e c tc o m p a r i s o no fZ (K,0) and Z (K,1) indicates that the threshold
K∗ is unchanged. Next lemma 8 shows that capital is growing over time, indepen-
dently of T. This implies that lemma 6 continues to apply and the household would
rather adopt immediately than wait any ﬁnite number of periods. Finally, since
30limT→∞ Z (K,T +1 )=L(K), we can apply lemma 7 as well, so the household would
rather adopt immediately than never adopt.
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